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I. INTRODUCTION
The business risk exclusion was first introduced as a provision 
in standard form comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies in 
1966.  This provision in 1966 form policies was intended to exclude
coverage for claims arising from inferior workmanship by the 
policyholder or its employees during the course of performing 
terms of a contract.1  A workable construct of the provision,
however, was not readily available until 1971 when Professor Roger 
C. Henderson clearly articulated the business risk doctrine—a
doctrine that more  fully explained the public policy purposes 
behind the business risk exclusion.2  After Henderson’s
explanation, courts began to more consistently rely on the business 
risk exclusion to support insurer decisions to deny coverage for 
property damage or personal injury caused by faulty workmanship.3
With some exceptions, this trend towards reliance on the 
business risk doctrine to exclude most claims arising from faulty 
workmanship endured in Minnesota courtrooms until the recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Thommes v. Milwaukee Mutual 
Insurance Co.4  The Thommes court appears to have concluded that 
business risk exclusions found in CGL policies do not preclude 
coverage for an insured in certain cases involving the infliction of 
damage on a third party.  After Thommes, if an insured causes 
damage to a third party, or if the damage is caused by an action for 
which a party contracted, a policyholder’s counsel will undoubtedly 
argue that there is support for a broad reading of the business risk 
exclusion.  However, given the strength of the dissent in Thommes, it 
may yet become an anomalous decision that is ultimately
distinguished by Minnesota courts in future opinions.
This article will first examine the role the Thommes decision
plays in the development of the business risk doctrine in
Minnesota.  Second, this article will detail the origin of the business 
1. Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations – What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 438-46 (1971).
2. Id.
3. James Duffy O’Connor, What Every Construction Lawyer Should Know About 
CGL Coverage for Defective Construction, 21 CONSTR. L. 15, 16 (2001).
4. 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002).  Prior to Thommes, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals appeared to signal some trend away from a broad application of the 
business risk doctrine by its decision in O’Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 
N.W.2d 99, 103-04  (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Gordon v. 
Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393, 401-02 (Minn. 2002).
2
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risk doctrine,5 the development of the Minnesota courts’ use of the 
business risk doctrine prior to Thommes,6 and the procedural
posture of Thommes.7 This article will then offer an analysis of 
Thommes, discussing how Thommes signals an evolution in position 
by the Minnesota courts that, while recognizing the possibility this 
evolution will reach a quick end.8  Finally, this article will offer 
considerations for insurance counsel regardless of whether
Thommes is an evolution or a short-lived revolution.9
II. HISTORY OF THE BUSINESS RISK DOCTRINE
CGL policies typically exclude coverage for defective
performance of a contractual obligation.10  The typical CGL policy 
accomplishes this intent through an exclusion known as a “business 
risk exclusion” or “own work” exclusion.  The standard form policy 
provides that liability insurance does not cover:
That particular part of real property on which you or 
any contractors working directly or indirectly on your 
behalf are performing operations if the [third party’s 
property damage claim] arises out of those operations or
That particular part of any property that must be
restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was 
incorrectly performed on it . . . . 
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or 
any part of it and included in the [complete operations
hazard coverage] . . . . 
[Property damage claims] arising out of:
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in “your product” or “your work” or
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your 
behalf to perform a contract or agreement in accordance 
with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other 
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. Id.
10. A CGL policy “is a standardized liability policy promulgated by a group of
organizations including the United States’ leading insurance companies.” Laurie
Vasichek, Note, Liability Coverage for “Damages Because of Property Damage” Under the 
Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 795, 798 (1984).
3
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property arising out of sudden and accidental physical 
injury to “your product” or “your work” after it has been 
put to its intended use.
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense insured 
by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, 
inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or 
disposal of
(1) “your product”
(2) “your work” or
(3) “impaired property”
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled 
from the market or from use by any person or
organization because of a known or suspected defect, 
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.11
The business risk doctrine, which describes the public policy 
behind the business risk exclusions found in standard form CGL 
policies, is derived from the fundamental principle of insurance 
law that insurers should not be held liable for risks within the direct 
control of the insured.12  Described in more detail:
The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the 
goods, products or work of the insured, once relinquished 
or completed, will cause bodily injury or damage to
property other than to the product or completed work 
itself, and for which the insured may be found liable.  The 
insured, as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a 
matter of contract law to make good on products or work 
which is defective or otherwise unsuitable because it is 
lacking in some capacity.  This may even extend to an 
obligation to completely replace or rebuild the deficient 
product or work.  This liability, however, is not what the 
11. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § T4.2 
(1994) [hereinafter STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS] (quoting
INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG-00-01-11-88
(1988), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF 
INSURANCE 186-87 (1990) (paragraph labels omitted).
12. See generally Henderson, supra note 1. Indeed, the mention of the 
business risk doctrine was surprisingly absent from reported cases from the time it 
was introduced into products hazards and completed operations policies in 1966, 
until it was plainly articulated in a Nebraska Law Review article written by Professor
Roger C. Henderson in 1971. Id. Professor Henderson is generally attributed with 
first articulating the business risk doctrine. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DISPUTES § 14.13 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DISPUTES].
4
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coverages in question are designed to protect against.
The coverage is for tort liability for physical damages to 
others and not for contractual liability of the insured for 
economic loss because the product or completed work is 
not that for which the damaged person bargained.13
The business risk exclusion is crafted to “limit the CGL to 
providing coverage for ‘tort liability for physical damages to others 
and not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss 
because the product or completed work is not that for which the 
damaged person bargained.’”14  The “exclusion resists any
policyholder tendency toward the moral hazard or adverse
selection of shoddy work by forcing the policyholder to internalize 
the costs of unsatisfactory operations.”15  Courts looking to apply 
the exclusion, as a result, must examine the nature of the
complaint to determine whether it arose from tort or from
contractual obligation.16
In 1979, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was one of the first 
courts to examine and openly endorse the business risk doctrine in 
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.17  Facing a claim by a policyholder for 
coverage caused by faulty stucco, the court construed the business 
risk exclusion found in the CGL policy to unambiguously exclude 
coverage for faulty workmanship where the damages were limited 
to the cost of correcting the work itself (i.e., cracks and other signs 
of faulty workmanship in stucco masonry).18  In so holding, the 
13. O’Connor, supra note 3, at 15 (quoting Roger C. Henderson, Insurance
Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations -- What Every Lawyer Should 
Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1970)).
14. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 12, at §
14.13(a) (quoting Henderson, supra note 1, at 441).
15. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 11, at §
T4.2.
16. Id.
17. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979). Weedo involved two consolidated claims against 
the same insured.  Both claims involved the construction of the same
comprehensive general liability provisions of a policy issued to a masonry
contracting insured. Id. at 789.
18. Id.  Weedo alleged, inter alia, that:
[A]s a result of the defective and unworkmanlike manner in which the 
defendants applied the said stucco, plaintiffs were compelled to and 
did cause the defects existing therein to be remedied, where possible, 
and the omissions  to be supplied, and, in general, were compelled to 
and did furnish all the work, labor, services and materials necessary to 
complete the application of the said stucco . . . .
Id.
5
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court found the risk of defective construction was not intended to 
be covered in a CGL policy.19
A number of jurisdictions have since joined the Weedo court,
invoking the business risk doctrine and its theoretical
underpinnings.  Among the jurisdictions applying the business risk 
doctrine to exclude coverage include: Colorado,20 Delaware,21
Florida,22 Indiana,23 Maine,24 North Carolina,25 North Dakota,26
The second claimants, the Gellas, sued their general contractor for alleged defects 
with roofing and gutter work performed by Stone-E-Brick pursuant to a
subcontract.  The general contractor sought indemnification from Stone-E-Brick,
alleging that plaintiffs’ damages were due to Stone-E-Brick’s “faulty workmanship, 
materials, or construction.” Id.
19. Id. at 791.  The court stated:
Unlike business risks . . . where the tradesman commonly absorbs the 
cost attendant upon the repair of his faulty work, the accidental injury 
to property or persons substantially caused by his unworkmanlike
performance exposes the contractor to almost limitless liabilities.
While it may be true that the same neglectful craftsmanship can be the 
cause of both a business expense of repair and a loss represented by 
damage to persons and property, the two consequences are vastly 
different in relation to sharing the cost of such risks as a matter of 
insurance underwriting.
Id.
The court further explained:
When a craftsman applies stucco to an exterior wall of a home in a 
faulty manner and discoloration, peeling and chipping result, the 
poorly-performed work will perforce have to be replaced or repaired by 
the tradesman or by a surety.  On the other hand, should the stucco 
peel and fall from the wall, and thereby cause injury to the homeowner 
or his neighbor standing below or to a passing automobile, an
occurrence of harm arises which is the proper subject of risk-sharing as 
provided by the type of policy before us in this case.
Id. at 791-92.
20. Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 
(D.Colo. 1994) (applying Colorado law, the district court held that exclusions
expressly precluded coverage for insured’s faulty workmanship and defective 
performance).
21. Vari Builders, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 523 A.2d 549, 552
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding business policy exclusion unambiguous, and
excluding coverage).
22. Tucker Constr. Co. v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 423 So.2d 525, 528 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982) (excluding coverage for property damage where the floor of a 
restaurant constructed by contractor settled).
23. Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. 1980) (excluding
coverage for defective workmanship where policy language unambiguously
excluded business risks).
24. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 386 (Me. 1989) (holding that 
exclusions unambiguously precluded coverage for business risk that insured
contractor’s product or completed work was substandard).
25. Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp.2d
6
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Oklahoma,27 Tennessee,28 and West Virginia.29  For example, in
holding that the insurer maintained no liability for the business 
risk exclusion precluding payment for damages due to
workmanship, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that “the 
injury to products or work exclusion is intended to exclude
insurance for damage to the insured’s product or work, but not for
damage caused by the insured’s product or work.”30  Thus, the 
exclusion does not apply where the product or work causes damage
to other persons or property.
As more courts expressly endorsed the business risk doctrine, 
it became a more efficient and effective means by which an insurer 
could deny coverage of a claim.31  Indeed, from the perspective of 
some policyholders, the business risk doctrine had grown so
powerful for insurers that it supported a denial of coverage even 
when the doctrine’s application was contradicted by the policy’s 
express language.32  For example, the policy provision at issue in 
Baylock & Brown Construction, Inc. v. AIU Insurance Co. expressly 
defined property damage as including:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property 
that occurs during the policy period, including the loss of 
569, 592 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that faulty workmanship did not constitute 
property damage under CGL policies). See also W. World Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 
369 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Barbee v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 408 S.E.2d 
840 (N.C. 1991).
26. Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 599, 605-06 (N.D. 1998) 
(finding that the injury to products or work exclusion precludes coverage for 
economic loss sustained by the insured due to repairing or replacing its own
defective work or products).
27. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250, 
253 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that a CGL 
policy does not extend to ordinary business risks and excluding coverage for 
property damage to insured’s products and work).
28. Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 S.W.2d 760, 
763 (Tenn. 1979) (relying upon Weedo and holding that no coverage existed for a 
breach of contract action grounded upon faulty workmanship or materials).
29. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement, Inc., 526 S.E.2d 
28, 33-34 (W. Va. 1999) (finding policy language unambiguous and holding that 
policy precluded coverage for workmanship).
30. Fisher, 579 N.W.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 
F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1988); Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888 
F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D.Colo. 1994); Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275, 
1279 (Ind. 1980); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 386 (Me. 1989);
Fisher, 579 N.W.2d at 605; Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
591 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tenn. 1979).
32. O’Connor, supra note 3, at 15-16.
7
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the use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss 
of the use of tangible property which has not been 
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is 
caused by an occurrence during the policy period.33
Nonetheless, the court denied coverage, citing the business risk 
doctrine.34
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS RISK DOCTRINE IN 
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Supreme Court first expressly endorsed the 
business risk doctrine in Bor-Son Building Corp. v. Employers
Commercial Union Insurance Co. of America.35  In doing so, the court 
turned to the Weedo opinion to support its broad finding that no 
insurance coverage existed for a general contractor whose liability 
arises from faulty workmanship and materials.36  The court
concluded, “[w]e are convinced that the standard comprehensive 
general liability policy does not provide coverage to an insured-
contractor for a breach of contract action grounded upon faulty 
workmanship or materials, where the damages claimed are the cost 
of correcting the work itself.”37  The court subsequently affirmed its 
Bor-Son holding in Knutson Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co.38
A number of courts refused to follow the breadth of the Bor-
33. 796 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
34. Id. at 153.  In an examination by the court of the conflicting positions of 
the plain language of the contract versus the business risk doctrine, the court 
found “coverage for property damage provided by the standard [CGL] policy 
[did] not extend coverage to an insured-contractor for a breach of contract 
action.” Id. See also Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tenn. 1979) (denying coverage on a similar basis).
35. 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982). Bor-Son involved two suits that alleged that 
water leakage in newly constructed high-rise apartment complexes were due to 
defects caused by the use of faulty materials and workmanship. Id. at 60.
36. Id. at 63-64.  The court found that all of the damages claimed by the 
building owner arose out of Bor-Son’s breach of contract, and it reasoned that the 
damages were a result of faulty workmanship in the performance of the contracts.
Id. at 63.  The court then concluded that “[t]his liability on the part of the 
contractor is not within the coverage of the contractor’s general liability policy.” 
Id.
37. Id.  (quoting Vernon Williams, 591 S.W.2d at 765).
38. 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986). In Knutson, the court considered the 
Weedo decision but also relied upon the Bor-Son decision. Id.  The court 
determined that building damage caused by a general contractor’s breach of 
contract duty due to faulty workmanship or use of defective materials was a 
business risk and was excluded from insurance coverage. Id.
8
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Son opinion.39  Some courts refused to follow Bor-Son without 
comment, whereas others expressly criticized the reasoning used by 
the Minnesota court.40  In Fireguard Sprinkler System Inc. v. Scottsdale 
Insurance Co., the court openly criticized the Minnesota court’s 
logic, indicating that because “a general contractor may have little 
or no effective control over the manner in which subcontractors 
perform work, [therefore the court finds] unpersuasive the
argument that because the prime contractor’s control makes the 
work of a subcontractor a contractual business risk, the prime 
contractor should not be able to obtain insurance against the 
risk.”41 Fireguard acknowledged, however, that the Bor-Son analysis 
may be properly limited to general contractor-subcontractor
relationships.42
Perhaps in response to the growing number of decisions
critical of the Bor-Son analysis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
refused to follow Bor-Son in its 1996 decision of O’Shaughnessy v. 
Smuckler Corp.43  In that case, the court limited the Bor-Son and
Knutson rulings to CGL policies patterned after the unendorsed 
1973 ISO CGL form.44  The court stated that the post-1986 policy 
expressly covered insured contractors for defective construction 
property damage.45  As a result, the court held that the business risk 
doctrine did not preclude coverage for damages arising out of the
defective work of a subcontractor.46  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
39. See, e.g., Fireguard Sprinkler Sys. Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. 864 F.2d 648 
(9th Cir. 1988); Md. Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 973-74 (1990); 
Southwest La. Grain, Inc. v. Howard A. Duncan, Inc., 438 So.2d 1224 (La. Ct. App.
1993); Corner Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 N.W.2d 887, 892-
94 (S.D. 2002); Mid-United Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Lloyds Ins. Co., 754 
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Fireguard, 864 F.2d at 653-54 (finding that Bor-Son’s explanation 
ignored the careful drafting of the policy); Green Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (W.D.Mo. 1991); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Tishman 
Constr. Co., 578 N.E.2d. 1197, 1201 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
41. 864 F.2d at 653-54.
42. Id. (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins., 323 
N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (Minn. 1982)).
43. 543 N.W.2d 99, 104-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 
Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W. 2d 393, 401-02 (Minn. 2002).
44. Id. at 103-05.
45. Id. at 104-05.  The 1986 exception states, however, that the exclusion does 
not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was 
preformed on ‘your behalf’ by a subcontractor.  Thus, the plain language of the 
exception provides that damages to ‘your work’ is covered if the damage results 
from the work performed by a subcontractor.” Id. at 104.
46. Id. at 104-05.
9
Dotseth et al.: Evolution or Revolution: Thommes' Role in the Development of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL DOTSETH THOMMES.DOC 10/28/2002 10:57 PM
606 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
denied review.
As a result of these mixed decisions, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the business risk doctrine was convoluted.
The court broadly denied coverage for damage related to faulty 
workmanship and materials in the early Minnesota cases of Bor-Son
and Knutson Construction.47 Then, in an apparent progression 
towards coverage, the court of appeals in O’Shaughnessy held that 
the business risk doctrine did not preclude coverage for defective 
construction in policies dated after 1986.48  In the midst of this 
uncertainty, Thommes presented an opportunity for Minnesota
courts to further clarify their treatment of the  business risk
doctrine.
IV. THE THOMMES DECISION
Dean Morlock, Charles Vig, and HHA Development, Inc.
owned a commercial development.49  John Krajewski and Donna 
Krajewski (Morlock’s sister) owned property directly adjacent to 
the development.50  In September 1996, Thommes & Thomas Land 
Clearing (“Thommes”) entered into a contract with Richard
Knutson, Inc., to clear trees from the HHA development.51  While 
describing the work that Thommes was to perform, Morlock
pointed out a tree which marked the property line up to which 
Thommes was to clear.52 He told Thommes not to worry about 
whether certain trees were on the development “because his sister 
owned the [adjacent] property.”53  Morlock mistakenly instructed
Thommes to clear approximately one-half acre of the Krajewskis’
land without obtaining the consent of the property owners.54
The Krajewskis filed an action against Thommes for damages.55
Thommes tendered defense to its CGL insurer, Milwaukee Mutual 
47. Bor-Son, 323 N.W.2d at 63; Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986).
48. O’Shaughnessy, 543 N.W.2d at 102-05.
49. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001).
53. Id.
54. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. Thommes first learned of his mistaken 
clearing of the Krajewskis’ land upon their bringing of an action against
Thommes. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.
55. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.
10
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Insurance Company.56  Milwaukee refused to defend and indemnify 
Thommes.57  Milwaukee asserted that the damage on the Krajewski 
property was not covered due to the business risk exclusions 
contained in sections  2j(5) and 2j(6) of Thommes’ CGL policy.58
Thommes sought a declaratory judgment that Milwaukee had a 
duty to defend and indemnify Thommes under the policy.59  Each 
party filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court 
granted Milwaukee’s motion.60
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court 
order and granted Thommes’ motion for summary judgment.61  In 
reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Milwaukee, the court of appeals began with the recognition that 
exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6) are business risk exclusions, designed to 
exclude coverage for faulty workmanship within the insured’s 
control.62  Implying that the policy exclusions were unambiguous,
the court found that “damage to third-party property caused by 
appellant’s work is not excluded from coverage” by exclusions 2j(5) 
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The relevant portions of Thommes’ CGL policy read:
I . Section I—Coverages
Coverage A. Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability
1.      Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to 
which this insurance applies
* * * *
2.         Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
* * * *
j.  Damage to property
“Property damage” to:
* * * *
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any
contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your 
behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out 
of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired 
or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.
* * * *
19.  “Your work” means:
Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf * * * .
Id. 158.
59. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
60. Id.
61. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 160.
62. Id.
11
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and 2j(6).63  Milwaukee appealed.64
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s 
holding, finding that the Milwaukee policy provided coverage.65  In 
so holding, the supreme court first turned to the basic rules of 
insurance policy construction.66  The court examined the express 
policy language to determine whether the policy unambiguously 
covered damage to the Krajewskis’ property.67  As a threshold issue, 
if the policy language was unambiguous, the court concluded it 
had no need to invoke extrinsic evidence or public policy.68
Exclusion 2j(5) provided that coverage did not exist for
“‘[p]roperty damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of real property 
on which you [Thommes] or any contractors or subcontractors 
working directly or indirectly on your [Thommes’s] behalf are 
performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those 
operations.”69  The court held the policy language was ambiguous, 
finding that the phrase “that particular part of real property on 
which you . . . are performing operations” was susceptible to more 
than one meaning.70  The court reasoned that because the phrase 
was not defined, and the express language did not clearly signify 
whether the land of a third party was covered, the exclusion was 
ambiguous.71  With little explanation, the court appeared to further 
endorse this conclusion by indicating “the underlying purpose of 
CGL insurance” supported finding that the phrase was
ambiguous.72
63. Id.
64. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
65. Id. at 884.
66. Id. at 880. The Minnesota Supreme Court criticized the court of appeals
for its failure to properly apply the rules of construction. Id.
67. Id. at 882.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting the policy language).
70. Id. at 883.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 884. An insurer counsel might argue that this reasoning departs 
from Minnesota contract law because courts should only look to the language 
within the “four corners” of the contract in determining if there is an ambiguity.
See, e.g., In re Quinlan’s Estate, 233 Minn. 35, 35, 45 N.W.2d 807, 808 (1951) 
(stating that “[t]he primary rule of construction is that the intent of the testatrix,
as expressed in the language of the will, is to be gathered from everything
contained within its four corners, as read in the light of the surrounding
circumstances”); Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 206 Minn. 257, 261, 
288 N.W. 847, 850 (1939) (finding no ambiguity in the contract and holding “such 
being the case, there is no room for construction even though the rule is that such 
a contract should be construed most favorably to the indemnitee”); Oleson v. 
12
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Exclusion 2j(6) provided that coverage did not exist for
“‘property damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of any property 
that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your
[Thommes’s] work’ was incorrectly performed on it,” where “your 
[Thommes’s] work” includes “work or operations performed by 
you [Thommes] or on your [Thommes’s] behalf.”73  The court 
concluded that this exclusion was ambiguous because it was unclear 
whether it applied only to work performed in a faulty or defective 
manner, and whether work was “incorrectly performed” if it was 
completed in the right manner but on the wrong property.74
Invoking contra proferentem75 the court reasoned that the exclusion 
applied only to work done in a faulty or defective manner; thus the 
property damage was covered because it was done in the right 
manner, just on the wrong property.76
After determining that the CGL exclusions were ambiguous, 
the court then turned to the business risk doctrine and recognized 
“that the underlying purpose of CGL insurance is to provide
coverage for the risk of tort liability to third parties, as opposed to 
risks that arise as a matter of contract law.”77 The court’s
determination that the exclusions did not clearly demonstrate 
intent to exclude the risk of liability for damage to third parties’ 
property supported its decision to enforce the coverage provisions 
of the policy.78
Justice Stringer, joined by Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Paul 
Anderson, dissented, indicating disagreement with the
characterization of the exclusions as ambiguous in nature; he 
believed the two provisions clearly and unambiguously excluded 
Bergwell, 204 Minn. 450, 454, 283 N.W. 770, 773 (1939) (“We are not permitted to 
so construe a contract as to avoid the chosen language used by the parties 
provided such language ‘is plain and unambiguous.’”). In Thommes, the court 
found two possible meanings of the policy exception, one derived from the plain 
meaning, and the other derived from the business risk doctrine.  641 N.W.2d at 
879-80.
73. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883.
74. Id.
75. Contra proferentem is a commonly used doctrine by which ambiguities in a 
document are to be construed unfavorably towards the drafter or in favor of 
coverage.  General Mills, Inc. v. Gold Medal Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
328 (7th  ed. 1999)).
76. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880.
77. Id. at 884.
78. Id.
13
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the Krajewskis’ property damage from coverage.79 Justice Stringer
suggested the majority distorted the policy language, and its
conclusion was “absurd and inconsistent with our long-standing
principle that we construe contracts to avoid absurd or unjust 
results, where reasonably possible.”80  Justice Stringer accused the 
majority of distorting the policy language in exclusion 2j(5) of the 
policy by limiting the definition of “real property on which you . . .
are performing operations” to that on which Thommes contracted 
to work. He stated that such a distortion “does not support a 
conclusion of ambiguity that justifies ignoring the 2j(5)
exclusion.”81  Justice Stringer would have also applied the 2j(6) 
exclusion, noting that “the insurance policy does not provide
coverage for claims for work incorrectly performed—and what 
could be more incorrect than performing the work on the wrong 
property?”82
V. A CONTINUING EVOLUTION OR MERELY A REVOLUTION?
The final impact of Thommes on the status of the business risk 
doctrine in Minnesota remains unclear.  Given the mixed history of 
the doctrine and the strength of the dissent, it is possible that 
Thommes may be viewed as an anomaly that is readily distinguished 
on its facts.  On the other hand, Thommes could be viewed as a sign 
of a further evolution toward a more limited view of the business 
risk doctrine in Minnesota.
Most likely, the Thommes decision reflects a more balanced 
approach to judicial treatment of the business risk doctrine in 
Minnesota. Traditionally, courts have used the business risk
doctrine to support a finding that CGL policies do not provide
coverage for property damage or for personal injury caused by the 
79. Id. (Stringer, J., dissenting):
On the contrary, the plain meaning of the provisions clearly provide 
for an exclusion from coverage . . . . The plain meaning is nothing 
more or nothing less than what the words say—here the exclusion 
applies because Thommes was “performing operations” on the
Krajewskis’ property by cleaning and grubbing their land, and damage 
to the Krajewskis’ trees, shrubs, and grass falls squarely within the 
reference to “property damage.”
Id.
80. Id. at 884-85.
81. Id. at 884.
82. Id. at 885.
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/2
FINAL DOTSETH THOMMES.DOC 10/28/2002 10:57 PM
2002] THE BUSINESS RISK DOCTRINE 611
insured contractor’s faulty workmanship.83 The typical analysis
asked whether the damage was caused by defective workmanship of 
the insured contractor.84  If the damage was caused by faulty
workmanship, coverage was excluded.  If the damage was
attributable to some other cause (i.e. the use of faulty materials), 
coverage might not have been excluded.
If Thommes is endorsed as an evolution of Minnesota law, 
Minnesota courts will now ask an additional preliminary question:
was the damage incurred by a third party?  If a court answers this 
question affirmatively, it appears that it will probably find that the 
CGL policy provides coverage, regardless of the cause of damage.
This analysis would be, of course, a shift towards an interpretation
of contracts to benefit those insureds who may have caused
personal injury or property damage to a third party,
notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between 
the third party and the insured.  This assumes that the insured’s 
acts would otherwise be covered because the insured acted
according to the conditions of the underlying contract.
Whether Thommes is ultimately judged  to be an evolution or a 
revolution, it is undeniable that counsel facing a business risk issue
must be prepared to address the impact of the decision.  At a 
minimum, insurance counsel must continue to consider whether 
the damage resulted from the insured’s faulty workmanship.85
Under Bor-Son, if the court found that the damage was caused by 
faulty workmanship, it would most likely find that coverage was 
excluded under a standard CGL policy.86 However, following
Thommes, practitioners should also consider the language and
purpose of the underlying contract between the insured and the 
third party.87  If the purpose and scope of the underlying contract 
for work is narrowly and precisely defined, and damage occurs 
outside the scope of that contract, the insured may now be able to 
successfully argue that coverage for such damage exists.88
83. See supra Part II. (describing the historical underpinnings of the business 
risk doctrine).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. (noting that historically courts have been primarily concerned 
with whether damage was a result of faulty workmanship).
86. Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 323
N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1982). 
87. For example, the purpose of the underlying contract in Thommes was to 
clear land.  641 N.W.2d at 879.
88. Id. at 884 (“Construing the exclusion narrowly against the insurer, as we 
must, we conclude that [the] exclusion . . . applies only to work performed in a 
15
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Insurance counsel should also be prepared to address the 
significance of who has incurred the damage.  Indeed, Thommes
might be interpreted by policyholder’s counsel to support an 
argument that the business risk doctrine does not apply to any 
third party damage cases.89
VI. CONCLUSION
The Thommes decision arrived at a time when Minnesota 
courts’ application of the business risk exclusions found in
standard CGL policies to claims arising from faulty workmanship
seemed convoluted.  At times, Minnesota courts had broadly
applied the business risk exclusions, denying coverage for damage 
related to faulty workmanship.  Later, Minnesota courts appeared 
to retreat from this position, indicating that its earlier holdings
were limited.  The Thommes decision may be considered an
evolution of Minnesota’s use of the business risk doctrine, an 
attempt to clarify how Minnesota courts will apply the doctrine to 
claims arising out of defective workmanship.  On the other hand, 
Thommes may only be a short-lived revolution, which will be quickly 
distinguished by the Minnesota courts.  Regardless of whether 
Thommes is an evolution or a revolution, Thommes clarifies the 
variables insurance counsel should consider when faced with a 
business risk exclusion issue.
faulty or defective manner and thus, does not bar coverage of the damage to the 
Krajewskis’ property.”).
89. See supra Part V.
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